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This book is the second of two volumes on “Basic Questions of 
Tort Law.” In the first volume, Professor Helmut Koziol examined 
German, Austrian, and Swiss tort law.1 In this volume, Professor 
Koziol has assembled essays by distinguished scholars from several 
European legal systems as well as the United States and Japan, each 
of whom follows the structure of Koziol’s earlier book and explains 
how those basic questions are handled in their own systems.2 
Throughout both volumes, Professor Koziol and his collaborators 
take a broad view of the topic under discussion, addressing not only 
the private law Americans call “tort” but also the role of insurance 
schemes in compensating injured persons. An advantage of the or-
ganizational scheme is that it facilitates issue-specific comparisons 
among the systems. Thus, Professor Koziol has also contributed a 
chapter, entitled “comparative conclusions,” in which he identifies 
similarities and differences among the various systems. Taken to-
gether, the system-specific chapters are a valuable resource for any-
one interested in a concise introduction to a particular system or in 
direct access to comparisons and contrasts among systems. Koziol’s 
                                                                                                             
 ∗   Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and Insurance Law, Univer-
sity of Georgia Law School 
 1. 1 BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE 
(Helmut Koziol ed., Sramek 2012) [hereinafter GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE].  
 2. The nation-specific essays include Bjarte Askeland (Norway), W. Jona-
than Cardi and Michael D. Green (United States), Katarzyna Ludwichowska-
Redo (Poland), Attila Menyhard (Hungary), Olivier Moréteau (France), Ken Oli-
phant (United Kingdom), and Keizo Yamamoto (Japan).  
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chapter on “comparative conclusions” is an incisive analysis of 
those comparisons and contrasts.  
Professor Koziol’s goal is more ambitious than simply to pro-
vide a convenient and current source of information about similari-
ties and differences in the way of personal injury, harm to property, 
and related problems are handled in a variety of legal systems. His 
overall aim, which he develops in his chapter on comparative con-
clusions, is to use the detailed comparative analyses contained in the 
two volumes as part of an effort to harmonize tort law across the 
member states of the European Union.3 Thus, the role of compara-
tive law as part of the larger project is to identify areas of agreement 
and disagreement across systems, so that work can proceed on con-
firming the commonalities and resolving out the disputed issues.  
This review focuses on Professor Koziol’s ultimate aim of har-
monization, and on the contribution of these essays to that project. 
Harmonization of tort law across the member states is not just a mat-
ter of working out answers to such questions as the content of the 
liability rule or whether non-pecuniary harm should be recoverable. 
Harmonization raises an issue of European Union federalism. That 
question is not explicitly addressed in either volume, yet the value 
of the project, and prospects for its success, turn on the answer to it. 
I argue that Professor Koziol has not made a convincing case for EU 
displacement of member state tort law. 
I. 
Ever since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the member states of the 
European Union have pursued the goal of “an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe.”4 The Union “shall promote eco-
                                                                                                             
 3. Helmut Koziol, Epilogue to 2 BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 685 (Helmut Koziol ed., Fiona Salter Townshend 
trans., Sramek 2015) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE]. 
 4. ROGER J. GOEBEL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW 3 (4th ed. 2015); for the current treaty provision, see Consolidated Version 
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nomic, social, and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Mem-
ber States.”5 A central feature of this program is the development of 
a common market throughout the European Union, in order to facil-
itate the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital.6 
One means of achieving greater integration of European Union 
economies is the harmonization of laws.7 Professor Koziol is among 
those who hope to persuade the European Union to harmonize tort 
law, either through a directive that sets forth EU-wide standards and 
constraints on how far a member state may deviate from those 
norms, or by the enactment of EU regulations that would override 
current member state law entirely and impose a uniform body of tort 
law on the member states.8 With that goal in mind, in 2005 the Eu-
ropean Group on Tort Law published its “Principles of European 
Tort Law.” A few years later, the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code and the Research Group on Existing EU Private Law “de-
signed a Draft Common Frame of Reference, presented to the public 
in 2008.”9   
The “main justification for harmonisation [is] … that the differ-
ences between the legal systems are hindering commercial cross-
border transactions in Europe.”10 Businesses that sell across na-
tional borders  are disadvantaged because they must learn about and 
comply with many different tort systems. Diversity of laws “gives 
rise to transaction costs, which can prove to be obstacles to the mar-
ket, especially for small and medium-sized businesses.”11 In a re-
lated vein, harmonization would reduce uncertainty as to the content 
of the applicable law “and could thus lead to a noticeable reduction 
                                                                                                             
of the Treaty on the European Union art. 1, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 13 
[hereinafter TEU].  
 5. TEU, Article 3, para. 3. 
 6. See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE 
FOUR FREEDOMS 3-33 (4th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2013). 
 7. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 499. 
 8. The distinction between regulations and directives is discussed in id. at 
154-55.  
 9. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 694.  
 10. Id. at 686 (italics in original).  
 11. Id. at 687. 
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of legal disputes and thus the consequential expenses of cases in-
volving damage that have an international aspect.”12 Furthermore, 
“European citizens—who are encouraged to move around in the Eu-
ropean Union—cannot be expected to be very understanding that, in 
the case of an accident, they are treated very differently depending 
on which legal system is applicable.”13 
For Professor Koziol, comparative analysis is a means to the end 
of greater harmonization of European tort law. The point of the two 
“Basic Questions” volumes, and of the comparative approach they 
take, is to provide information helpful to achieving the harmoniza-
tion project. He argues that “we have to know even more about the 
fundamental ideas of other legal systems to better understand each 
other and to explore the different legal cultures and the ways of 
thinking in other countries.”14 Comparative study helps us to “rec-
ognize the common bases,” “discover new tools for solving prob-
lems, become more open-minded for different ideas and increase the 
understanding of fundamental perspectives.”15 Armed with this 
knowledge, we will determine just how far it is feasible to go with 
harmonization. Koziol is confident that “if all show good will and 
cooperate in a reasonable fashion, we will reach the goal, maybe not 
an ideal concept on the first go, but at least the basis for further im-
provement.”16 
 The project’s merit depends on the premise that greater uni-
formity is an especially valuable goal, so much so as to overcome 
competing considerations. Yet there are grounds to question the 
need for greater uniformity across the EU in the tort context and to 
doubt whether the costs of pursuing it are worth the benefits. In my 
view, the essays assembled here provide at least as much, if not 
more, support for the anti-harmonization view than for Professor 
                                                                                                             
 12. Id. at 688. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 695. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 704. 
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Koziol’s project. With regard to the role of comparisons in answer-
ing the question of whether greater harmonization is called for, I 
believe that it is appropriate to compare the EU to the United States, 
and to focus the comparison on the question of whether variations 
among member state tort laws actually retard the growth of a feder-
ation-wide common market. The history of the United States and its 
economic success, suggests that a multiplicity of approaches to tort 
law does not stand in the way of a strong market economy. Just as 
the U.S. successfully copes with a variety of tort systems, so also 
may the EU manage to get along without systematic harmonization. 
II. 
Few would question the value of harmonization in the operation 
of a well-functioning market in the EU, including its role in provid-
ing greater variety and lower prices for goods and services, and eas-
ier movement of persons throughout Europe. It is widely agreed that 
the harmonization project over the past fifty years has contributed 
to the success of the EU. But merely pointing to the existence of 
benefits cannot make the case for greater harmonization in any given 
sphere because the benefits of harmonization come at a price. Ra-
ther, the strength of that case turns on whether the benefits are worth 
the costs. Since the costs and benefits vary depending on context, 
the question raised by the effort to harmonize tort law is not whether 
harmonization has benefits. Rather, the question is whether the spe-
cific benefits of this particular harmonization project is worth the 
costs. 
 Given the variety of factors that matter in making that assess-
ment of costs and benefits, reasonable people will differ on whether 
the former outweigh the latter. This volume’s comparisons between 
tort regimes may be helpful in making that assessment. In my view, 
however, a more illuminating comparison is available. I have in 
mind the experience of the United States, for each of the fifty states 
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has its own tort system. Nonetheless, the United States has suc-
ceeded at establishing and maintaining a national market. That ex-
perience seems to me to raise doubts about the claim that disuni-
formity is a serious impediment to a well-functioning market. There 
are nearly twice as many “member states” in the U.S. as in the EU, 
and the market is spread over a larger area. In some ways, these fea-
tures of the U.S. system present greater hurdles to buyers and sellers 
than in the EU, yet market participants manage to cope well enough. 
Variations among legal regimes do not seem to unduly impede the 
free movement of goods, services, people, and capital. 
Professor Koziol’s answer to the American counterexample is to 
assert that “the legal systems of the EU Member States vary a great 
deal more than the legal systems of the states in the USA.”17 Thus, 
“[t]here exists not only a fundamental difference between the com-
mon law in England and Ireland on the one hand and the Continental 
civil law on the other but also divergences between the civil law 
systems.”18 Much of the force of his argument turns on the former 
distinction, between common law and civil law systems. He notes 
that “the characteristic feature of the Continental legal systems is 
that they are codified, in contrast to English case law.”19 There are 
also differences in the way tort law is organized. Thus, “[c]ontinen-
tal laws of damages are somewhat homogenous legal areas… In 
contrast, common law proceeds on the basis of a multitude … of 
individual ‘torts.’”20 As for specific rules, he points out that “[t]he 
absence of any strict liability for motor vehicles is perhaps the most 
marked difference between English law and that of most European 
countries.”21  Punitive damages are more readily available in com-
mon law than in civil law jurisdictions.22 Styles of legal reasoning 
differ as well, in ways that are hardly limited to tort law. Common 
                                                                                                             
 17. Id. at 686. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 695.  
 20. Id. at 697.  
 21. Id. at 700. 
 22. Id. at 701. 
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law courts proceed case by case, while continental lawyers “begin 
with a general abstract rule, which has been formulated by the leg-
islator.”23  
But Professor Koziol’s catalog of ways in which English and 
Continental law diverge may be largely moot, as his point has been 
overtaken by the UK’s upcoming secession from the EU. One con-
sequence of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union is that 
these differences among EU member states will be far less important 
in practice after Brexit. There will no longer be a large EU member 
state with a different legal tradition from all the rest. One way to 
look at Brexit is that it facilitates harmonization by removing a large 
obstacle. On the other hand, the UK’s departure substantially re-
duces the disuniformity that, under basic EU principles, would jus-
tify intervention to protect the single market.  By contrast, Ireland is 
a small nation whose distinctive legal system has little impact on the 
general effectiveness of the common market. It seems inappropriate 
to allow the disuniformity between its common law approach and 
the Continental approach to drive so consequential a decision as the 
harmonization of all of European tort law. As an American might 
put it, paying so much attention to Ireland would allow a small tail 
to wag a very large dog.  
Ireland aside, it is not at all clear that the variations among con-
tinental legal systems are much greater than the variations among 
the fifty states that make up the United States. As examples of dif-
ferences among EU member states, Professor Koziol cites “diver-
gences . . . in respect of the notion of fault or wrongfulness, strict 
liability and vicarious liability, recoverable non-pecuniary loss and 
time limitations.”24 One answer to this claim is that the existence of 
variations does not establish that the variations are unmanageable. 
The essays Koziol has collected in this volume provide little support 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. at 702. 
 24. Id. at 695. 
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for the notion that the member states of the EU differ in radical ways 
in their approaches to tort law, nor does Koziol assert that they do. 
The main point is that all of them favor compensation of the vic-
tim of an accident, whether through “tort” liability (as a common 
lawyer would call it) or through social insurance of some kind. Thus, 
according to Professor Moréteau, “the French are convinced that so-
ciety works better when its members agree to share and equalize the 
burden on risk and adopt a solidarity model.”25 In Norway, accord-
ing to Bjarte Askeland, “it is important that the victim’s damage is 
remedied or the injury compensated in full,” by a combination of 
tort law and social insurance.26 Katarzyna Ludwichowska-Redo 
states that “[a] tendency has been noted in Poland over the last dec-
ades to strengthen the protection of tort victims,” by “the growing 
significance of responsibility independent of fault” and by a “trend 
towards objectivizing fault liability.”27 Attila Menyhard notes that 
“the structure, the basic principles and means of risk allocation in 
Hungarian law are in line with the main structures and principles of 
other jurisdictions,”28 including a growing role for insurance rather 
than fault.29 Across all of the systems surveyed in the study, “[t]here 
is consensus on the essential issue that the responsible injuring party 
must in principle pay full compensation—no less, but no more.”30 
Of course, in all of these systems there are limits on recovery. Pro-
fessor Moréteau points out that in France, “much as in common law 
or Germanic jurisdictions, significant compensation of pure eco-
nomic loss is mainly to be found in the contractual sphere.”31 An-
other common thread is that victims typically do not recover without 
a good reason (often, but not necessarily, fault) to hold the defendant 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. at 4.  
 26. Id. at 99-100.  
 27. Id. at 165.  
 28. Id. at 254.  
 29. Id. at 255.  
 30. Id. at 825.  
 31. Id. at 76.  
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liable.32 Yet another is that a victim’s own faulty conduct is relevant 
to the amount obtained, but is not an absolute bar.33 
Continental systems differ mainly on the particular means by 
which compensation is to be achieved. For example, Professor 
Koziol notes the difference between French and German approaches 
to accident law. The German Civil Code favors “firm, detailed 
rules,”34 while the French Code (and the Austrian Code as well) “are 
formulated in a more general and elastic manner.”35 Despite these 
variations, the underlying aims of tort liability are similar through-
out the Continental systems. As Professor Koziol notes in his treat-
ment of the Germanic perspective in volume I, “[i]n Continental Eu-
rope, it is generally recognized that the primary aim of the law of 
tort is to compensate the victim for damage sustained.”36 He adds 
that “[i]t is widely recognized today that besides this compensatory 
function … the law of tort serves a deterrent function.”37 Yet in his 
“comparative conclusions,” Professor Koziol pays more attention to 
variation on matters of detail among EU member states than he does 
to their general agreement on basic principles.  
Turning to the U.S. side of the comparison, Professor Koziol 
may not fully appreciate the level of variation among the fifty states 
of the U.S. For example, he notes differences among EU systems 
with regard to damages available to the family members of fatally 
injured accident victims.38 In the U.S., this topic is covered by stat-
utory law in each state because common law courts long ago rejected 
recovery for “wrongful death,” as it is called.39 As in the EU, there 
                                                                                                             
 32. See id. at 59-66 (France); id. at 131 (Norway); id. at 220 (Poland); id. at 
307 (Hungary); see also GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 171, 200.  
 33. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 67-68, 89 (France); id. at 
145 (Norway); id. at 234 (Poland); id. at 327 (Hungary); see also GERMANIC 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 256-57.  
 34. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 704.  
 35. Id. at 705.  
 36. GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 47.  
 37. Id.  
 38. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 587.  
 39. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 783-86 (11th ed., Aspen Publ’g 2016).  
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are significant variations among those statutes. Some states only al-
low for survivors to recover for the amounts they would have re-
ceived from the deceased, while others provide for recovery of the 
whole value of the life. Professor Koziol observes that “[t]he na-
tional rules on prescription offer a great diversity of different pre-
scription periods.”40 But the same is true in the U.S., where statutes 
of limitations (as they are called) vary from one state to another.41 
On at least one issue there is more uniformity across EU legal sys-
tems than among the fifty states. In the EU the plaintiff’s fault gen-
erally reduces but does not preclude recovery. By contrast, Jonathan 
Cardi and Michael Green note, in their essay on U.S. law, that many 
of the American states allow no recovery if the plaintiff’s share of 
the fault is equal to or greater than the defendant’s, and a few treat 
any contributory negligence by the plaintiff as a complete bar.42 
Professor Koziol criticizes EU efforts to harmonize private law 
by directives on specific topics, such as products liability. Ironically, 
his objections belittle his claim that U.S. law features less variation 
than Continental Europe. Thus, the current EU approach of “selec-
tive harmonization leads … to a double shattering of the law.” One 
kind of “shattering” occurs because “the national legal systems be-
come infiltrated by foreign provisions.”43 This is precisely what 
happens on a routine basis in the U.S., whenever the national gov-
ernment preempts state law on some specific topic, such as automo-
bile safety44 or liability for pharmaceuticals.45 Indeed, a character-
istic feature of any federal system in which sovereignty is divided 
                                                                                                             
 40. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 828.  
 41. Id. at 509.  
 42. Id. at 495-96.  
 43. Id. at 690.  
 44. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S. Ct. 1913, 
146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000).  
 45. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 180 
L.Ed.2d 580 (2011).  
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between the center and the periphery is the presence in a given do-
main of some issues governed by member state law and other issues 
governed by the central authority.46  
The other “shattering of the law” Koziol references here is that 
“the EU’s directives and regulations are not based on a consistent 
and overall concept and therefore are very often not in accordance 
with one another.”47 His complaint here is that “[e]very directive of 
the European Union is a compromise between the varying national 
views and the outcome depends on national interests as well as the 
nationality and personality of the members of the Commission.”48  
The same is true of the law making process of the U.S. Congress 
when it displaces state tort law. For that matter, the same would be 
true if the EU were to undertake the general harmonization of tort 
law favored by Professor Koziol. With particular regard to product 
liability, Koziol criticizes the EU’s products liability directive for 
failure “to attain a consistent and thus fair overall system.”49 But the 
U.S. has done no better. For example, businesses that sell products 
across state lines must take account of three different definitions of 
“design defect,” including a “consumer’s expectations” test, a “risk 
utility” test, and a “reasonable alternative design” test.50 Again, U.S. 
(and EU) manufacturers have managed to cope with the variety and 
uncertainty that is generated by such an untidy system. 
III. 
Professor Koziol focuses all of his attention on reasons to sup-
port EU harmonization of tort law. But his argument is incomplete, 
as the Treaty on the European Union does not authorize EU inter-
vention just because there are reasons in its favor. Rather, “[t]he use 
of union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity 
                                                                                                             
 46. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 488-89 (7th ed., Foundation Press 2015).  
 47. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 690.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 691.  
 50. See EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 39, at 704-07. 
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and proportionality.”51 The principle of subsidiarity is that, unless a 
topic is within the exclusive competence of the EU, “the Union shall 
act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action can-
not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.”52 The principle 
of proportionality holds that “the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties.”53 These constraints on EU intervention are directly rele-
vant to the question of whether to harmonize tort and accident law. 
Since these areas are traditionally handled at the member state level, 
the principle to subsidiarity seems to place a significant burden on 
the advocates for intervention to show why it is not better to leave 
well enough alone. Showing that varying legal regimes, and at-
tendant costs, may justify an intervention on a particular topic such 
as products liability, but wholesale intervention across all of tort and 
accident law may not be a proportionate response. 
Despite their presence in the Treaty on the European Union, 
these proportionality and subsidiarity provisions are not in most in-
stances strong legal constraints on EU legislation.54 The Court of 
Justice of the European Union has generally taken an expansive 
view of EU legislative authority. If EU legislators decide that the 
norms of subsidiarity and proportionality are satisfied, these norms 
may well be sufficiently supple to permit Professor Koziol’s pro-
posal to withstand a challenge in the Court of Justice. In any event, 
it is useless to try to assess the legal viability of a harmonization 
directive or regulation until one is enacted, or at least a concrete pro-
posal is advanced.  
Even so, the proportionality and subsidiarity constraints are 
highly relevant to the legislative policy issue of whether EU inter-
vention is called for, all the more so in an era when the enthusiasts 
of closer EU integration meet with ever greater resistance from some 
                                                                                                             
 51. TEU, supra note 4, at art. 5, para. 1.  
 52. Id. at art. 5, para. 3.  
 53. Id. at art. 5, para. 4.  
 54. See GOEBEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 173 (discussing subsidiarity); id. at 
201-08 (discussing the somewhat stronger principle of proportionality). 
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of the member states. Accordingly, it is not premature to suggest 
that, in deciding whether and how far to go forward with this har-
monization project, EU legislators must take account not only of the 
benefits of harmonization, but also of the costs of displacing mem-
ber state law. If the benefits of disuniformity are sufficiently great, 
EU legislators may find that they outweigh the arguments favoring 
an EU-wide system of tort law. Thus, the case for EU intervention 
is not complete without asking whether the costs of displacing mem-
ber state control are worth the benefits of uniformity.  
General costs of any EU displacement of member state law, in 
this or any other context, are the loss of local autonomy and a lesser 
role for democratic decision making, as unelected officials in Brus-
sels override local office holders who are directly accountable to 
voters.55 In the specific context of tort law, member states may differ 
among themselves on the precise mix of policy objectives, such that 
a “one-size-fits-all” rule would necessarily deprive at least some of 
them of the opportunity to pursue their goals. For example, the Nor-
wegian approach to accident law puts considerable weight on the 
compensation of victims and spreading of losses through insurance. 
This policy is followed so intently that tortfeasors may escape lia-
bility entirely when insurance is available.56 As a result, such goals 
as corrective justice and deterrence may be sacrificed. Other mem-
ber states may put more weight on the latter set of goals. While the 
current approach permits this kind of variety, the harmonization of 
European tort law would threaten it. Similarly, some member states 
are more receptive than others to the recovery of non-pecuniary 
damages. Professor Koziol sees this divergence as a tough problem 
that raises “fundamental questions,”57 which he addresses at some 
                                                                                                             
 55. For a summary of the values promoted by state autonomy in the U.S. 
context, see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
110-11 (19th ed., Foundation Press 2016). It may not be appropriate to draw a 
close analogy between the U.S. and the EU, as the member states of the EU have 
considerably more autonomy than the fifty states of the U.S. 
 56. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 100.  
 57. Id. at 768.  
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length. From a perspective that values the diversity that comes with 
federalism, the variety of approaches is not a problem. In fact, we 
may over time gather valuable information from observing the ef-
fects of one approach over another.58 
The diversity one currently observes may not be fully explained 
by divergent values. Different approaches to a given problem may 
be due to variations in the level of one or another type of dangerous 
conduct. If drivers in one member state take greater risks than in 
another, it may be appropriate to impose greater personal tort liabil-
ity in the former than the latter in order to induce drivers to be more 
careful. Without unduly disparaging the skills of French drivers, it 
is worth noting that in France, if not in Norway, “reckless drivers 
end up paying significantly higher premiums, whilst a careful driver 
with no accident liability on record may see his or her premium re-
duced by half.”59  
Legal culture may differ from one member state to another, such 
that judges will be more familiar with one style of reasoning than 
another. Professor Koziol distinguishes between two approaches. 
On the one hand, German tort law is characterized by firm, detailed 
rules.”60 On the other, the Austrian and French principles “are for-
mulated in a more general and elastic manner.”61 As for himself, 
Professor Koziol prefers “a middle course” between the two.62 But 
the relevant question is not “what is the optimal approach?” as an 
abstract proposition. The German approach may work well in the 
German context and the French approach in the French context.  The 
issue for EU legislators is whether the project of integrating the 
economies of EU member states is significantly hindered by simply 
                                                                                                             
 58. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 59. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 3, at 5 (Olivier Moréteau dis-
cussing French law).  
 60. Id. at 704.  
 61. Id. at 705.  
 62. Id. at 707.  
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allowing each member state to formulate the law as it sees fit. In 
resolving that question it is important to keep in mind that a given 
legal system may work differently in its actual operation than is ap-
parent to an outsider. For example, Professor Koziol finds that “[t]he 
French legislator and the Cour de Cassation almost never give suf-
ficient reasons and therefore one never knows why a case is solved 
in a particular way and one never knows beforehand how the next 
case will be solved.”63 Yet it appears that lawyers and scholars 
trained in the French system are able to surmount the difficulties.64 
 
IV. 
 
My reservations relate solely to the strength of the case for har-
monizing European tort law. The research, analysis, and exposition 
of the issues in both volumes of “Basic Questions” are exemplary. 
A close study of Professor Koziol’s chapter on “comparative con-
clusions” will repay anyone interested in the comparative study of 
tort and accident law. This is an essential volume—as is Professor 
Koziol’s volume on the Germanic perspective—for anyone inter-
ested in the comparative perspective on these topics.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at 704.  
 64. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 38-61, 
303-05, 307-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).  
